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FOR MCHENRY OF US IPU DELEGATION

FOLLOWING ARE POINTS MADE BY SECRETARY IN CONVERSATION WITH PIRNIE AND ALLOTT DURING AUG 30 CONVERSATION:

THERE WAS, OF COURSE, ABSOLUTELY NO UNDERSTANDING, TACIT OR OTHERWISE, BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR ON THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AT AN EARLY STAGE, BEFORE THE INVASION, THE US HAD EMPHASIZED TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN THAT THE REACTION OF THE US AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD BE STRONGLY CRITICAL OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THERE WAS ALSO ABSOLUTELY NO INVOLVEMENT OF THE CIA AND THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY WARNED AGAINST USING THE MYTH OF THE THREAT OF GTE IMPERIALISM UNDTE AS A PRETEXT FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION.

THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT OF COURSE NATO EXISTED, AS DID THE WARSAW PACT, AND THAT THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES ACROSS THESE LINES COULD MEAN WAR, BUT THE EXISTENCE OF THESE: ALLIANCES: DOES NOT MEAN THAT A MEMBER OF EITHER SIDE HAS THE RIGHT TO MOVE FORCES AGAINST COUNTRIES WITHIN EITHER GROUP.

THE US REACTION TO THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS NOT BASED ON ANY COZINESS WITH THE CZECHS. INDEED, THE US HAS HAD

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# TELEGRAM



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MANY PROBLEMS WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THESE INCLUDED PROBLEMS WITH THE DUBCEK GOVT. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS A MAJOR SOURCE OF APMS TO NORTH VIETNAM AND WAS VERY ACTIVE IN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD. THE US POSITION, THEREFORE, WAS: BASED ON THE RIGHT OF COUNTRIES TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS AND WAS TAKEN IN SPITE OF DIFFERENCES WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

- 3. DISCUSSION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AT THE IPU WILL DEPEND GREATLY ON THE PRESENCE AND ATTITUDES OF THE CZECH AND OTHER DELEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. IF THE CZECHS ARE PRESENT THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRESSURE BY THE SOVIETS TO DISCOURAGE DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET INVASION. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHATEVER RESTRAINT THE SOVIETS HAVE EXERCISED THUS: FAR HAS RESULTED FROM A DESIRE TO KEEP THE POLITICAL COSTS OF ITS DRASTIC ACTION AT A MINIMUM. CZECH AND WORLD REACTION AGAINST THE INVASION IS A CONTINUING RESTRAINING FACTOR AND COULD GREATLY AFFECT SUCH THINGS AS TROOP REMOVAL.
- 4. WORLD REACTIONS (INCLUDING COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: SUCH AS ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA) TO THE SOVIET ACTIONS HAVE: BEEN ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY CRITICAL AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE IPU AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS IF THE MATTER COULD BE KEPT OUT OF BILATERAL US-SOVIET TERMS AND FOCUSED ON THE FACT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE FACE OF CZECH OPPOSITION.
- 5. NATO. ALTHOUGH SOVIET ACTIONS WERE NOT DIRECTED AT NATO, ORDINARY PRUDENCE REQUIES THAT NATO CONSIDER THE WISDOM OF REALIGNING ITS FORCES IN LIGHT OF THE WESTWARD AND SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF TO 15 WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS TO AREAS WHERE NOWE HAD EXISTED BEFORE. SUCH A REALIGNMENT WOULD BE IN SHARP CONTRAST TO DESIRES EXPRESSED AT THE RECENT ICELAND MEETING OF NATO THAT BOTH SIDES LOOK TOWARD A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF TROOPS.
- 6. THERE SHOULD BE NO FALSE HOPES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

  THE USSR IS EXTREMELY SERIOUS AND HAS REACTED TOUGHLY TO STEM WHAT IT CONCEIVED AS BEING AN INFECTION WHICH MIGHT SPREAD THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH THREATS ARISING FROM (A) REMOVAL OF PRESS CENSORSHEP IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA:

(B) THE POSSIBLE EROSION FROM THE WARSAW PACT: AND (C) QUESTIONING OF THE MONOPOLY POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

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THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS APPARENTLY THE MOST IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF ITS DIRECT AFFECT ON THE SOVIET UNION.

7. DUBCEK AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD PROBABLY BEEN RETURNED TO POWER BECAUSE CZECH PEOPLE'S BEHAVIOR BORE OUT SVOBODA'S WARNING THAT NO PUPPET GOVERNMENT COULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE CZECH PEOPLE. PARTIALLY AS A RESULT OF IDEOLOGY AND MISINFORMATION, THE SOVIETS MAY ORIGINALLY HAVE THOUGHT OTHERWISE. DUBCEK AND HIS COLLEAGUES MAY NOW SEEK TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH CONTINUED ECONOMIC CHANGES, BUT THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPOSITION OF PRESS CENSORSHIP! AND THE SOVIET FORCES WILL PROBABLY REMAIN JUST INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE CZECH BORDERS.

8. THE INVASION MIGHT RESULT IN A MOST UNFORTUNATE SETBACK IN US-USSR RELATIONS, AFFECTING, FOR EXAMPLE, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CZECH DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT REMOVED OTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE CONTROL OF EXPENSIVE AND DANGEROUS ARMS, VIETNAM, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND OTHER QUESTIONS REMAIN TO BE DEALT WITH.

9. VIETNAM. THERE HAD BEEN NO MAJOR CHANGES ON VIETNAM SINCE THE IPU LAST MET. CRITICS OF US BOMBING SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT FOUR-FIFTHS OF NORTH VIETNAM WAS FREE OF BOMBING BUT ALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM REMAINED SUBJECT TO BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS: OF WAR. THE US WAS INTERESTED IN WHAT ACTIONS NORTH VIETNAM WOULD TAKE IF THE REMAINING BOMBING WERE HALTED. ANY CLUE OR ANY HINT WHICH MIGHT RE HELPFUL IN THE PARTS NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE FOLLOWED UP IMMEDIATELY.

10. THE DELEGATION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SHARPLY REFUTE ANY CHARGES OF ANY ANALOGY BETWEEN THE ACTIONS OF THE US IN VIETNAM AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND SOVIET ACTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THERE WAS A CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIONS TAKEN TO PERMIT PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR DWN FUTURE AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT THAT DETERMINATION.

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